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The importance of innovation and technical change to the railroad
industry is widely recognized. In a recent paper, Healy has gone so far
as to suggest that, under present conditions, they may be of paramount
importance.
Because of the erosion of the other aspects of authority and responsibility,
and the simultaneous appearance of major technological advances in other
types of transportation, the responsibility for technological innovation among
the various remaining responsibilities of management has become paramount.
It is not an overstatement to say that both the place of railroads as a whole in
the total transport picture and their individual economic success depend more
than anything else upon the technological advances which managements
develop and put into effect.'
Granting the significance of technical change, the following important
questions arise concerning the extent of the technological advances
that have occurred in recent years in the railroad industry and the
process by which such advances have been introduced and have gained
acceptance. How rapidly have labor and total factor productivity been
increasing in the railroads? How rapidly has the production function
shifted over time? How have important inventions in the railroad
industry been distributed over time? Have the largest railroads tended
Nom: The work on which this paper is based is part of a larger project on
research, innovation, and economic growth, supported by a grant from the National
Science Foundation. I am indebted to M. Hamburger, F. Levy, L. Rapping, and
0. Williamson for comments on an earlier draft and to C. Phillips for assistance.
My thanks also go to J. Schmookler for making unpublished data available and to
the many people in the railroad and related industries who provided information.
1K.Healy, and Technological Change," in Technological Change
andthe Future of the Railways,Evanston, 1961,p.126.170 TECHNICAL CHANGE EN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY
Figure 1
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o be the pioneers in introducing these new techniques? Once a new
echnique is introduced by one company, what determines how rapidly
aher companies take it up? What determines how rapidly its use
preads within a company? Specifically, what sorts of innovation have
)ccurred in recent years in railroading? What prospective changes in
.echnology seem most promising and what effects are they likely to
iave on railroad employment?
II. In creases in Productivity
f here is an enormous literature concerned with the uses and misuses
)f average productivity measures—labor, capital, and total. If technical
±ange is defined as a shift in the production function, it is generally
igreed that increases in output per man-hour and in output per total
ractor input are incomplete measures of the rate of technical change.2
Nonetheless, itis also agreed that, if properly used, they provide
valuable, if only partial, information regarding changes over time in an
Lndustry's input requirements.
Figure 1 shows the pre-1954 movement in the railroad industry of
Dutput per man-hour, the most widely used average productivity
measure. Between 1890 and 1925, Output per man-hour went up about
as rapidly in the railroad industry (2.5 per cent per year) as in all
transportation (2.6 per cent per year),3 but much more rapidly than in
the economy as a whole (2.0 per cent per year).Between 1925 and
1953, although output per man-hour continued to rise more rapidly in
railroads (3.0 per cent per year) than in the economy as a whole
(2.4 per cent per year), it rose much more slowly than in all transpor-
tation (4.5 per cent per year).4
2is obvious that changes in output per man-hour generally do not measure
thifts in the production function. Moreover, only under quite restrictive conditions
do changes in output per total factor input measure shifts in the production function
E.. Domar, "On Total Productivity and All That," Journal of Political Economy,
December 1962).
Of course, in view of the fact that the railroads were then such a large proportion
of the transportation industry, this is what one would expect.
These. growth rates (and all others in this section) are only approximate, since
they were computed by finding the rate of growth of output per man-hour between
the initial and terminal years, ignoring the intermediate years. Nonetheless, they
ire reasonably adequate approximations and good enough for present purposes.
too, when examining Figures 1 and 2, that the railroads have been operating at
less than full capacity.
For discussions of various types of productivity measures, see Output, Input, and
Productivity Measurement, Studies in Income and Wealth 25, Princeton University
Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1961; and J. W. Kendrick,
Productivity Trends in the United States, Princeton for NBER, 1961. For discussions172 TECHNICAL CHANGE IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY
Over the entire period, 1890—1953, Output per man-hour rose, on
the average, about 2.8 per cent per year in the railroad industry. This
increase was due partly to increases in the amount of capital utilized
per man-hour. According to Kendrick's figures, the capital-labor ratio
increased by about 50 per cent between 1890 and 1953. It was also due
partly to changes in technology.Diesel locomotives replaced steam
locomotiyes, automatic hump yards replaced flat yards, centralized
traffic control and other signaling devices were introduced, mechani-
zation of maintenance-of-way became important, and countless other
improvements were made.5
Comparing years (1889, 1899, 1909, 1920, 1929, 1941, and 1950) when
the railroad industry was operating at fairly high levels of capacity
utilization, in an effort to exclude the effects of the business cycle, we
find that apparently output per man-hour in the industry increased at
a fairly steady rate through that long period. This is interesting, since
one might suppose, with Fabricant and others,6 that output per man-
hour would tend to increase at a decreasing rate as an industry matured.
These data, however, provide no indication of that.7
Figure 2 shows the long-term movement in the railroad industry of
output per total factor input. Whereas data on output per man-hour
take no account of changes over time in the amount of capital utilized
per man-hour, the data in Figure 2 do take account of such changes,
total factor input being a weighted combination of labor and capital
inputs. The results indicate that output per total factor input rose
more rapidly during 1890—1953 in the railroad industry (2.6 per cent
per year) than in the economy as a whole (1.7 per cent per year), but
less rapidly than in all transportation (3.1 per cent per year).Of
of railroad productivity indexes, see H. Barger, TheTransportation Industries, 1889—
1946, NewYork, NBER, 1951; D. Munby, "The Productivity of British Railways,"
D. W. Glassborow, "The Comparison of Partial Productivity Ratios for National
Railway Systems," and M. E. Paul, "International Productivity Comparisons Over
Time," all in Bulletinof Oxford Institute of Statistics, Feb.1963; and E. Mansfield
and H. Wein, "Notes on Railroad Productivity and Efficiency Measures," Land
Economics, Feb.1958.
Kendrick, ProductivityTrends, pp.543—545,containsthe data on which the
figure in the text is based. For a detailed discussion of recent increases in railroad
efficiency, see J. Nelson, RailroadTransportation and Pub/ic Policy, Washington,
1959,Chap.8.
S. Fabricant, TheRelations Between Factory Employment and Output since 1899,
OccasionalPaper 4, New York, NBER, 1941.
The rates of growth of output per man-hour (in per cent) were: 2.7 (1889—99),
1.1 (1899—1909), 3.3 (1909—20), 2.7 (1920—29), 3.6 (1929—41), 3.1 (1941—50), and
2.6 (1950—57). There is no indication of a decrease over time. This has also been
pointed out by H. Barger, TheTransportation Industries, p.95.rECHNICALCHANGEIN THE RAILROADINDUSTRY 173
Figure 2
Output Per Total Factor Input:
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course, the more rapid increase in nonrailroad transportation may
been due partly to exclusion of government inputs like highways. Ex
cluding years of deep depression and war, the rate of increase remainec
fairly steady in the railroad industry, the results being similar to thosc
based on output per man-hour.8
Finally, a word should be added on the changes in railroad pro
ductivity since 1953.According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics
output per man-hour increased by about 5.8 per cent per year in th
railroad industry during 1953—61. This was a much greater
inthe railroads (3.0 per cent per year ir
1925—53) or simultaneously in the private economy as a whole (2.7 pei
cent per year in 1953—61). The new techniques that helped to brink
about the spurt in railroad productivity are described in Section VIII.
III. Sh(fts in the Production Function
Technical change is defined here as a shift in the production function
To measure such shifts in the railroad industry during 1917—59, I shal
use the following highly simplified model, which was first employed
Solow9 to analyze economy-wide data. First, I assume that all technica.
change in the railroad industry was capital embodied. To become
effective, all innovations had to be embodied in new plant and equip
ment. Second, I assume that, for capital installed at time v which
still in existence at time t, the production function was
= (I
where is the output derived at time t from this capital,
the amount of labor used at time t in combination with this capital
is the amount of such capital in existence at time t, andis
rate of technical change. Note that Equation 1 implies that technica
change was neutral, that it proceeded at a constant rate throughou
the period, and that there were constant returns to scale.Third,
assume that all capital, regardless of vintage, depreciated at a constan
annual rate of ô and that at any point in time the industry's total labo:
force is allocated efficiently among various vintages of capital. Feather
bedding of many kinds is allowed by the model, since the working labo:
force may be larger than the firms consider optimal. Moreover,
results are not affected if a certain (fixed) per cent of the total time pu
in by labor is useless "make work."
STherates of growth of output per total factor input (in per cent) were:3.
(1889—99), 1.8 (1899—1909), 3.3 (1909—20), 1.8 (1920—29), 2.9 (1929—41), 2.9
Again, there is no evidence of a decrease over time.
R. Solow, "Investment and Technical Progress," in Mathematical Methods in th
SocialSciences, Arrow,Karlin, and Suppes, Eds., Stanford, 1960.TECHNICAL CHANGE IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 175
Given these assumptions, one can easily show that
Q(t) = (2)
where Q(t) is the total output of the industry at time t, L(t) is the total




where1(v) is the industry's gross investment at time v, and ci =ô+








Thus, one can estimate 2—the rate of technical change—in the
following way.First, using data regarding Q(t), L(t), anditis an
easy matter to compute R(t). Second, substituting for dR(t)/dt
and inserting data regarding 1(1) and ô, one can estimate the left-hand
side of Equation 3. Third, if the left-hand side of Equation 3 is regressed
against time, the product of the regression coefficient and (1 —oc)is an
estimate of 2.
This procedure was used to estimate the rate of technical change in
the railroad industry during 1917—59. Following Bowden,'° Q(t) was
set equal to the number of ton-miles plus 2.6 times the number of
passenger-miles for Class I line-haul railroads during year t, the result
being expressed as an index number (1929 =100)."L(t) was "total
time paid for" by class I line-haul railroads in year t,'2 the result being
expressed as an index number (1929 =100).1(t), expressed in millions
of 1929 dollars, was measured by Ulmer's figures13 on gross investment
10 Bowden, "Productivity,Hours, and Compensation of Railroad Labor,"
?tlonthly Labor Review, Dec.1933,pp. 1277—1278. For those years for which Barger
Transportation Industries) provided data, I used his figures on Q(t).Of course,
ailroad output is multidimensional and this output index is very crude. For an
malysis of technical change which takes account of the multidimensionality of an
ndustry's output, see V. Smith, "Engineering Data and Statistical Techniques in the
of Production and Technological Change:Fuel Requirements of the
rrucking Industry," Econometrica, Apr. 1957.
11 Of course, Q(t) really should be measured by value added, but I assume that
,alue added is proportional to output.
12 For those years for which Barger (Transportation industries) provided data, I
ised his figures on L(t). Although they pertain to time worked, rather than time paid
or, the index numbers are not affected much by the difference. Figures for later
rears come from Statistics of Railways.
" M. iJimer, Trends and Cycles in Capital Formation by United States Railroads,
Occasional Paper 43, New York, NBER, 1954. Also, see his Capital in
rransportaf ion, Communications, and Public Utilities:Its Formation and Financing,
'rinceton for NBER, 1960.176 TECHNICAL CHANGE IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY
by railroads (1917—50) and the corresponding figures issued by the
Department of Commerce (1951—57).Finally, the average value of
labor's share of the industry's value added during 1946—57 was used as
an estimate ofand, following Ulmer (p. 49), .02 was used as an
estimate of a.Needless to say, these estimates are very rough.
The resulting regression, omitting cases where + ÔR(i) < 0, is
+ ln[
Jo ]
= —413+ .213t. (r= .89) (4)
(.020)
The regression coefficient has the expected sign and is highly significant.
Moreover, Figure 3 shows that this regression fits the data reasonably
well.The regression coefficient multiplied by (1— givesthe
estimate of A, .030, its standard error being .003. This is higher than
Solow's estimate of A for the entire economy (.025), though the
difference is probably statistically nonsignificant.
In Equation 4, I obviously had to omit cases where + c5R(t) <
0. As Solow has pointed out, the omitted years tend to be those in
which there was a serious drop in output; and this is a rough way of
dealing with the fact that, although the model assumes the industry is
always working up to capacity, obviously it has not been.As an
experiment, I tried to handle this problem in another way. I obtained
from various members of the industry rough estimates of the ratio of
actual to capacity output and the ratio of actual to capacity labor
requirements during each year.'5 Dividing Q(t) by the former ratio
and L(t) by the latter, we obtain estimates of capacity output and
capacity labor requirements. Using these figures rather than Q(t) and
and L(t), we obtain the following regression:
=—23.8+ .007t.(r=.00) (5)
(.008)
The regression coefficient is not statistically significant, and the fit is
extremely poor.Apparently, the estimates of the ratios were too
inaccurate to be useful in this sort of analysis.
In this model, as well as in the older ones where technical change was "dis.
embodied," labor's share will equalif the value of labor's marginal product is set
equal to the wage rate. Of course, in a regulated, highly unionized industry likc
railroads, this may not be a very suitable assumption. But the resulting estimate ol
(.86) is very close to one made by L. Klein (.89) which rests on somewhat different
assumptions (see L. Klein, ATextbook of Econometrics, Evanston,1956, p.
These estimates are rough, but it is difficult to see what alternative procedures coulc
have been used.
These estimates were obtained in interviews with executives of several











SouRcE: See Section III.
In conclusion, the rate of technical change in the railroad industry,
as measured by A, seemed to be about 3.0 per cent per year during
1917—59, which is higher—though perhaps not significantly so—than
the corresponding estimate for the entire U.S. economy. Needless to
say, the model underlying this estimate is oversimplified in some
respects, and consequently the estimate, although reasonable, should
be treated with caution.'6
18Someof the difficulties are as follows:First, contrary to the model, technical
change may not have been neutral, some of it may not have required new capital,
there may have been economies or diseconomies of scale, labor inputs may not have
been homogeneous over time and, once capital was installed, there may not have
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IV. Timing of Invention
The model in the previous section throws little light on the underlying
processes of invention, innovation, and diffusion that are responsible
for the estimated shifts in the production function.In this section,
together with Sections V—VI, I turn to these processes.Specifically,
the present section is concerned with the distribution over time of
important railroad inventions, the object being to determine whether
such inventions have been distributed in accord with various hypotheses
put forth by Kuznets, Schmookler, and others.
At the outset, one should note that there are enormous problems in
obtaining a meaningful and useful definition of an "invention" and in
evaluating the contribution of a particular invention to an industry's
technology.Results obtained are bound to be crude. The procedure
adopted is to use Schmookler's chronology of patents and important
railroad inventions and to analyze the distribution over time of all
patents, all important inventions, and those considered by Schmookler
to be "most important." Obviously, the findings can only be suggestive,
since, as Schmookler points out, the data are very rough.'7
Two hypotheses regarding the timing of invention have received
considerable attention.First, there is the hypothesis, put forth by
Kuznets, Burns, Fabricant, and others,'8 that the rate of occurrence of
significant inventions decreases as an industry grows older."Every
technical improvement, by lowering costs and by perfecting the utiliz-
ation of raw materials and of power, bars the way to further progress." 19
Second,the railroads may have been operating off the production function during
some of the period because of slack demand and inefficiencies. Third, the data used
to estimate A are rough. Fourth, technical change, as defined here, is a catchall that
includes the effects of many factors other than the improvement of techniques (see
E. Domar, "On the Measurement of Technological Change," EconomicJournal,
Dec.1961, PP. 709—729).
Note too that the research and development underlying the technical change in
the railroad industry have been carried out largely outside the railroad industry.
J. Schmookler, "Changes in Industry and in the State of Knowledge as Deter-
minants of Industrial Invention," in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity:
Economic and Social Factors, Special Conference 13, Princeton for NBER, 1962.
I am grateful to Schmookler for making his unpublished worksheets and the chron-
ology of inventions used in his paper available to me.
S.Kuznets, Secular Movements in Production and Prices, Boston, 1930; A. F.
Burns, Production Trends in the United States Since 1870, New York, NBER, 1934;
S. Fabricant, Factory Employment and Output; and J. Wolf, Die Volkswir:schaft
der Gegenwort u. Zukunft,Leipzig,1912.
10Quotedfrom ibid., by Kuznets, Secular Movements in Production and Prices,
p. 11.TECHNICAL CHANGE IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 179
Second, there is the hypothesis, put forth by Schmookler, that significant
inventions tend to occur during periods when investment is high.
"The trend and swings of invention are probably caused. .. bythose
in investment or by the same forces which dominate the latter." 20
Totest these hypotheses, we regress the number of inventions in
year t on the amount of railroad capital formation (in millions of
1929 dollars) in year (t —3)and on t. A three-year lag is used for the
investment variable, because this is the lag adopted by Griliches and
Schrnookler.2' For all of Schmookler's "important" inventions, the
results are:
n(t) =39.0+ .00l1I(t —3)—•.0200t,(r=.46) (6)
(.0004) (.0048)
where n(t) is the number of these inventions occuri ing in year t, and 1(t)
isthe railroad capital formation in year t.Figure 4 contains the time
series of n(t).Letting n(t) be the "most important" inventions, the
results are
n(t) =14.1—.000031(t—3)—.0071t. (r.17) (7)
(.00029) (.0034)
Letting n(t) be the number of patents, the results are
n(t)4510 + .9361(r —3)—2.04t.(r =.41) (8)
(.223) (2.63)
The results are usually in accord with the hypothesis of Kuznets,
Burns and Fabricant, the regression coefficient of t being negative and
statistically significant in two of the equations. The results are also in
general accord with the Schmookler hypothesis, the regression coeffi-
cient of I(t —3)being positive and statistically significant in two of the
equations. Of course, it may be objected that the number of inventions
in each year should be weighted by some measure of importance. But
20 Schmookler, "Changes in Industry,"p. 215. Note that Schmookler's tests of
this hypothesis are based on the same data used here, but the methods are entirely
different.
21 Z. Griliches and J.Schmookler, "Inventing and Maximizing," American
EconomicReview(September 1963). Their data do not pertain to the railroads and
their techniques are different.
We use the period 1870—1950, because annual data on 1(t) do not seem to be
available for earlier years and because of the particularly great difficulties in eval-
uating the importance of very recent inventions.Besides the regressions shown
below, regressions including j2 as an independent variable, as well as r and 1(t), were
run. The effect oft2 is not significant.Number of major invent ions
4
SouRcE: Schmookler, "Changes in Industry and in the State of Knowledge.'
if Schmookler's weights22 (by technological and economic importance)
are used in Equation 7, the results change very little.Unfortunately,
such weights are not available for Equations 6 and 8.23
It is interesting that, although the probability of a major invention
has decreased over time, the rate of productivity increase has not slowed
down. Perhaps the rate of invention has decreased substantially only
in fairly recent years and it has not yet had an effect on the rate of
productivity increase. The data in Figure 3 seem to suggest that ,z(t)
22Schmookler,"Changes in Industry."
23Inaddition, I ran Cox's test of randomness against trend. The results indicate
a.downward trend. See D. Cox, "Some Statistical Methods Connected with Series
of Events," Journalof the Royal Statistical Society, 1955; andE. Mansfield, "Power
Functions for Cox's Test of Randomness Against Trend," Technometrics,Aug.
1962.
With regard to Schmookler's hypothesis, it should be noted that if 1(t), rather
than I(t —3),is used, it is not statistically significant in Equations 6 or 7, but it is
statistically significant in Equation 8.It is also interesting that Schmookler's hypoth-
esis holds most strongly for relatively unimportant inventions.This seems
reasonable to me and I suspect it is true in other industries as well.
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was lower during 1930—50 than previously, and that the trend in n(t)
was relatively slight before 1930.24
V. Size of Innovators
The importance of the innovator—the firm that first introduces a new
technique commercially—has been stressed by Schumpeter and others.
Is it true, as Schumpeter claimed, that the innovators in recent years
have tended to be very large firms? Have the largest firms been the
first to introduce a disproportionately large share of important new
techniques? This section is concerned with these questions, which are
obviously important from the point of view of public policy, and which
throw further light on the process of technical change in the railway
industry.
First, consider the extent to which the largest railroads have been
the innovators. Healy25 includes the following in a list of ten major
innovations introduced in the railroad industry since (1) four-
wheel trailing trucks and large fire box for steam locomotives, (2) the
diesel-electric switcher, (3) the diesel-electric passenger locomotive,
(4) the diesel-electric freight locomotive, (5) the roller bearing, (6) the
streamlined, lightweight passenger car, (7) the AB freight airbrake,
(8) air conditioning, (9) car retarders, and (10) centralized traffic
control. Taking this very small sample of innovations, I determined
which firm was first to introduce each one and the size distribution of
the innovators.26
The results, shown in Table 1, seem to support the Schumpeterean
view. Almost all the innovators were among the ten largest firms, and
24Althoughthere was some downward trend in n(t)before1930, it was relatively
slight. Only after 1930 was there an appreciable drop. This would seem to be in
accord with the hypothesis in the text, but another possible explanation is that it is
very difficult to gauge the importance of recent inventions, and many important ones
are omitted from the list. Moreover, the general decline in patenting may have been
important too.
For some tentative results regarding the timing of inventions—
and their effect on investment, see E. Mansfield, "Timing of Innovation and the
Investment Function," Carnegie Institute of Technology, 1963.
25K.Healy, "Regularization of Capital Investment in Railroads," in Regulariza-
lion of Business Investment,Special Conference 4, Princeton for N.BER, 1954.
26Theinnovator is defined as the firstfirmtointroduceaninnovationcommercially.
The identity of the innovator in each case was determined by a careful search of past
issues of trade journals like Railway Age. Of course, there may be arguments over
the definitions of "the innovation" and "commercially." Although it is possible that
some of the information is incorrect, it is unlikely that there are any errors of real
consequence.182 TECHNICALCHANGE IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY
TABLE1






A.EACHSYSTEMREGARDED AS A UNIT
Less than 4,000 77 0.0 0
4,001 —8,000 6 0.0 0
8,001 —12,000 7 0.0 0
12,001 —16,000 8 3.0 3
16,001 —20,000 3 0.5 1
20,000 and over 3 6.5 3
B.INDIVIDUALCLASSI LINE—HAUL RAILROADS1'
Less than 4,000 159 1.0 1
4,001 —8,000 9 0.0 0
8,001 —12,000 12 2.0 2
12,001 —16,000 4 1.0 1
16,001 —20,000 1 0.5 1
20,000 and over 3 4.5 3
Source:See Section 5.
two firms began using an innovation at about the same time,
the credit was split equally between them.Thus, fractions occur in
this column.
bmereis one lees innovation in this part of the table than in
the upper part, because one of the innovators, although part of a
very large system, was not a Class I line—haul railroad.
aboutone-half were among the four largest. Moreover, although the
largest four firms account for about 32 per cent of the industry's ton-
miles, they account for 65percent of the innovations. Thus, if one
assumes that these innovations are a representative sample, the largest
four firms accounted for a significantly larger share than would be
expected on the basis of their share of the freight traffic.By this
criterion, their share of the innovations was• disproportionately large.27
27Thechances are less than .05thatthe observed difference (between .65and.32)
is due to chance. Of course, no attempt is made to weight the small numbers of
innovations included in Table 1 by their importance. Moreover, the smaller, less
important innovations are excluded altogether. The results in Table 1 can only be
regarded as a very rough, partial measure of the size distribution of the innovators.
Note too that the criterion used to judge whether the largest firms' share is dispro-
portionately large is not the only one that could have been used. But it seems to be
a reasonable one.
In Table 1, two different definitions of a firm are used. In the upper panel, an
entire system is regarded as a single unit. Thus, the firms are either entire systems or
Class I line-haul railroads that do not belong to any system. In the lower panel,
each Class I line-haul railroad is regarded as a single unit, whether or not it belongs
to a System.TECHNICAL CHANGE IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 183
Next, consider a simple model designed to explain why the largest
firms in some industries but not in others do a disproportionately large
share of the innovating. Since this model, which I have described in
more detail elsewhere,28 seems to work reasonably well for other
industries, it is of interest to determine how well it can explain our
results for the railroads. Consider all innovations introduced during a
given period in a particular industry which required, for their intro-
duction, a minimum investment of I.Letting be the proportion




B1(i) + + E,(I)S, ￿ M
where S, is the size (measured in terms of assets) of the 1thifirm.Of
course, B1(I), B2(I), and M vary among industries and time periods,
B2(I) is non-negative, and E,(I) is a random error term.2°
Firms below a certain size (M) introduce none of the innovations
because they lack the volume of production required to use the in-
novation profItably.3° For firms larger than M, we suppose that the
proportion of these innovations introduced by a firm is a direct, linear
function of its size. In addition, we assume that a firm's size has more
effect on ir,(I)ifthe innovations require relatively large investments
than if they can be introduced cheaply. Consequently,
B2(t) =a1+ + z, (10)
where isthe average assets of the firms with assets greater than or
equal to M, a2 is presumed to be positive, and z is a random error term.
It follows that the proportion of all the innovations carried out by
the four largest firms equals
=4/N(M)+ 4a1(S4— + 4a21(S4 — + z', (11)
where N(M) is the number of firms with assets greater than or equal to
M, 54 is the average assets of the four largest firms, I is the average
minimum investment required to introduce these innovations, and z'
28E.Mansfield, "Size of Firm, Market Structure, and Innovation," Journalof
Political Economy (December1963).
It may turn out that ,r,(J) is a linear function of S,/S5, rather than S,. If so,
> M
themodifications required in the subsequent analysis are straightforward. See Mans-
field, "Size of Firm."
For simplicity, I assume that M is the same for all innovations. Although it
complicates things, it is possible to allow for differences among innovations in M.184 TECHNICAL CHANGE IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY
is a random error term.3'Inserting estimates of a, and a2 obtained
from a study of the steel arid petroleum industries,32 we have
=4/N(M)+ .0014(S4SM)+.02891(54—5M)/5M +z'. (12)
To what extent can this equation, based on experience in the steel
and petroleum industries, predict the behavior of the largest four firms
in the railroad industry? Since the value ofderivedfrom Table 1
could, with reasonable probability, depart from the true value by as
much as .25, simply because of sampling errors, it is clear that a test of
this sort will not be very powerful. Nonetheless, it is worth carrying
out.Ignoring 1, the estimate of irobtainedfrom Equation 12 is
•54,33 which is reasonably close to .65, the value of7Tderivedfrom
Table 1. Thus, taking account of the independent variables in Equation
12, it appears that, in comparison with other industries, the estimate of
the largest four railroads' share of the innovations is higher than would
be expected, but that the difference could easily be due to chance. Data
of the sort presented in Table1will have to be gathered for more
railroad innovations if we are to tell whether this difference is due
merely to sampling variation or whether there is a real difference in
this regard between the railroads and other industries.34
VI. Interfirm Rates of D?ffusion
Once one firm introduced a new technique, how soon did others in the
railroad industry come to use it? Apparently, twenty years or more
elapsed before all major railroads began to use many of the important
twentieth century innovations in locomotives, signaling, and yards.
In particular, it took about fifteen years for the diesel locomotive,
31Thisalso assumes that =0.Note that S4, and I are expressed in
millionsof 1950dollars.'
32 Mansfield, "Size of Firm, Market Structure, and Innovation." Of course there
could be an identification problem in equation (11) (seemy discussion in ibid.).
To obtain this number, we needed rough estimates of M, SM, and I.Asa
very rough estimate of M,5 billionton-miles in 1920 were used.(Althoughthisis
not'measured in terms of assets, itmakesno difference.) To estimate SM and the
average ton-miles of(I) all firms with more than 5 billion ton-miles, and (2) the four
largest firms were each multiplied by the average ratio of total assets to ton-miles for
the ten largest firms. As a rough estimate of 1, SI million was taken. Although
these estimates are crude they should not be too wide of the mark. To convert them
from 1920 to 1950dollars, theyweremultipliedby theratioof the .1950 to the 1920
ENR constructionindex.Note too that systems are used here as individualfirms.
Note that there are sampling errors in the estimates of a2 and a2, as well as in
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twenty-five years for the mikado locomotive, twenty years for the four-
wheel trailing truck locomotive, twenty-five years for centralized traffic
control, and thirty years for car retarders.35
What determines how rapidly a particular innovation spreads from
one company to another? According to a simple model presented
elsewhere,36 the probability that a firm will introduce a new technique is
an increasing function of the proportion of firms already using it and
the profitability of doing so, but a decreasing function of the size of the
investment required. Given these assumptions, and some additional
ones of a technical nature,37 it can be shown that
=u0 + u1p2+ u2s1+ (13)
whereis a measure of the rate of diffusion (the number of years that
elapsed between the time when 10 per cent of the major firms had
introduced theinnovation and the time when 90 per cent had done
so),is a measure of the relative profitability of theinnovation (the
average payout period required to justify investments during the
relevant period divided by the average payout period for investment in
theinnovation), S2 IS a measure of the size of the investment required
(the average initial investment in the innovation as a per cent of the
average total assets of the firms), and z' is a random error term.38
Inserting estimates of the u's based on data pertaining to a dozen
innovations, the resulting equation is
—.066
—.130
= +•121/'Z — + (r =.997) (14)
—.118 (.034) (.0032)
—.134
where the top figure in brackets pertains to the brewing industry, the
next to bituminous coal, the following to iron and steel, and the bottom
figure pertains to the railroads.Ignoringthisequation, which is
plotted in Figure 5 for the railroad industry, can represent the data for
E.Mansfield, "Technical Change and the Rate of Imitation," Econometrica,
Oct. 1962, pp. 741—766; Healy, "Regularization of Capital Investment."
36Mansfield,"Technical Change."
Ibid., pp.747—748.
38Actually,g, is not used in ibid.asa measure of the rate of diffusion, but the
measure used there is too complicated to be taken up here. The spirit and most of
the substance of the original argument can be conveyed by usinggi, rather than the
original measure. Equations 13 and 14 were derived from the original equations by
using the theoretical relationship between gi and the original measure.1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 p
SOURCE: Equation 14.
these innovations very well. Apparently, for these innovations, differ-
ences inand s2 explain almost all the variation in the rate of diffusion
within a particular industry.39
Comparing these various industries, p2 and s2 being held constant,
the average rate of diffusion in the railroad industry seems slower than
Besidesandseveraladditional variables were included—the durability of
old equipment, the rate of expansion of the industry, the phase of the business cycle
when the innovation was introduced, and a trend factor. Although the effects of all
of these factors on g, seemed to be in the expected direction, none of them was
statistically significant.
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Figure 5
Average Number of Years Between Introduction
of an Innovation by 10 Per Cent and 90 Per Cent
of Major Railroads, Given Relative Profitability
of Innovation (p) and Relative Size
of Necessary Investment (s)
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in iron and steel, bituminous coal, and brewing. For example, if
1.5 and= .50, theaverage time span between 10 and 90 per cent
of full introduction seems to be six years shorter in steel than in the
railroads, two years shorter in coal, and fourteen years shorter in
brewing. However, although the difference, between the railroads and
brewing is highly significant, the differences among the railroads, coal,
and steel could be due to chance. To the extent that they exist, these
differences may be due in part to the conservatism of railroad manage-
ment, the financial ill-health of the industry, and the attitude of railway
labor.4°
Finally, what sorts of railroads tend to be relatively quick to begin
using new techniques, and what sorts tend to be relatively slow? To
judge from data on the diffusion of fourteen innovations (five from the
railroad industry), the speed with which a particular firm begins using
a new technique is directly related to its size and the profitability of its
investment in the technique. But a firm's rate of growth, its profit
level, its liquidity, its profit trend, or the age of its management seem
to have no consistent or close relationship with how soon a firm adopts
an innovation. Moreover, in the railroad industry (and in most others
that could be studied), only a relatively weak tendency existed for the
same firms to be consistently the earliest to introduce different in-
novations. The leaders in the case of one innovation are quite often
followers for another, especially if the innovations become available
at widely different points in time.4'
VII. Intrafirm Rates of Diffusion
The previous section is concerned with the rate at which firms in the
railroad industry begin to use new techniques. This section examines
Forsome discussion of the attitude of railway labor toward technological change,
see W. Haber, "Technological Innovation and Labor in the Railway Industry," in
TechnologicalChange and the Future of the Railways, Evanston,1961;and,in the
same volume, G. Brown, "The Attitude of Labor Toward Technological Change in
the Railway Industry." Also included in that volume are relevant papers by J.
Nelson ("Technological Change and the Railway's Need for Capital") and W.
Cottrell ("Sociological Barriers to Technological Change").
Fora detailed discussion of the factors influencing how rapidly a particular
firm begins using a new technique, see E Mansfield, "The Speed of Response of
Firms to New Techniques," QuarterlyJournal of Economics, May1963. This study
includes data on the iron and steel, bituminous coal, brewing, and railroad industries.
Of course, there is no contradiction between the findings (1) that, holding the
profitability of the innovation constant, the innovators tend to be large firms and
(2) that there is only a fairly weak correlation between how rapidly a firm introduces
one innovation and how rapidly it introduces another.188 TECHNICAL CHANGE IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY
the influence of various factors on the intrafirm rate of diffusion,42 the
rate at which a firm, when it has begun to use a new technique, continues
to substitute it for older methods.In particular, one of the most
important recent innovations in railroading, the diesel locomotive, is
singled out and a simple econometric model is described, which explains
a considerable portion of the observed differences among railroads in the
TABLE2
TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN DATES WHEN DIESEL LOCOMOTIVES
WERE 10 PER CENT AND 90 PER CENT OF ALL
THIRTY CLASSIRAILROAD SYSTEMS
Numberof








Source:Statiotias of Railroad8, 1925—61.
Note:Among the 30 Class I railroad systems,
entire systems are included as single units.
rateat which, after first introducing it, they substituted diesel motive
power for steam.
Table 2 shows, for thirty randomly chosen Class I railroads, the
number of years that elapsed between the time when each road's diesels
constituted 10 per cent of its locomotive stock, and the time when they
constituted 90 per cent of its locomotive stock. Although this is a crude
measure of the intrafirm rate of diffusion,itis a reasonable first
approximation. According to the table, there was great variation among
railroads in that rate.Although nine years were required on the
average to increase a firm's stock of diesels from 10 to 90 per cent of
the total, six firms took only three or four years and three took
fourteen years or more.43
42Amore complete description of the results contained in this section is presented
inE.MansfIeld, "Intrafirm Rates of Diffusion of an Innovation," Reviewof Econom-
icsand Statistics, November 1963.
Of course, this is a crude measure, for several reasons.First, it is based on
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The following model will help explain the differences. Let D2(t)be
the number of diesel locomotives owned by thefirmat time t,be
the number of steam locomotives owned by the firm before it began to
dieselize, and bethe number of steam locomotives replaced by a
single diesel. Assuming that thefirm's traffic volume and r.remain
approximately constant during the relevant period,44 the total number
of locomotives owned by thefirm at time t is
t2(t) = — — 1)D1(t). (15)
Since the firm will therefore employ N1/r1 diesel locomotives when fully
dieselized, there are —D.(t)]places left to be filled with diesels
at time t.
Letbe the rate of return the 1thi firm could obtain by filling one of
these places with a diesel locomotive (assuming for simplicity that this
rate of return is the same for all places and all t);be the time interval
(in years) separating the year when the first firm (in this country)
"began"45 using diesel locomotives from the year when thefirm
"began" using them;be a measure of its size (its freight ton-miles
in 1949); andbe a measure of its liquidity at the time it "began" to
dieselize (its current ratio). Letting
=[D2(t +1) — —D2(t)], (16)
we suppose that
W1(t) L1, S•, C1, ...). (17)
The rationale for this hypothesis is as follows: Other things equal,
one would expect proportion of unfilled places that were
filled with a diesel locomotive during the period—to be directly related
to Pi and inversely related to the apparent riskiness of the investment.
Since the latter cannot be measured directly, we assume: (1) the longer
a firm waited before "beginning" to use the diesel locomotive, the more
knowledge it had regarding its profitability when it "began" to dieselize;
and (2) the nearer a firm was to full dieselization at time t (i.e., the
kinds of services, e.g., switching, freight. Third, it is based on the arbitrary choice
of 10 and 90 per cent.I.f we use a better measure based on utilization data for freight
service, however, we find there are still considerable differences among firms in the
intrafirm rate of diffusion, although not so large as in Table 2. Moreover, the model
described below is about as useful in explaining these data as those in Table 2.
"This is only a first approximation, but data indicate that it fs reasonably accurate
during the relevant period of time.
The date when a firm "began" to dieselize is the date when 10 per cent of its
locomotives were diesels.190 TECHNICAL CHANGE IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY
greater was r2D2(t)/Nj, the less was its uncertainty at time t relative to its
uncertainty when it "began" to dieselize.In addition, because the
more liquid firms were better able to finance the necessary investment
and to take the risks, one might expect them, all other things being
equal, to have invested more heavily than other firms had.Finally,
smaller firms might have been expected to convert to diesels more
rapidly than larger ones because of the costliness of operating two kinds
of motive power in a small system, because of the smaller absolute
investment required to convert, and perhaps because of the quicker
process of decision making in smaller units.
We assume that W2(t) can be approximated within the relevant range
by a quadratic function of ...,C2,but that the coefficient of
is zero. Then, substituting the corresponding differential
equation for the difference equation that results, and recognizing that
urn D2(t) =0,it can be shown that
=+ + ç62L2 + + ç64C2 + (18)
whereisa random error term and Q.isthe time interval between the
date when 10 per cent of thefirm's locomotives were diesels and the
date when 90 per cent of them were diesels.46 Using rough estimates of
p2,47itwas possible to estimate the the result being
=—.163+ .900+ .048L•—.0028S, + .115C2,(19)
(.492) (.008) (.0023) (.040)
whereisomitted. About 70 per cent48 of the variation among firms
in the intrafirm rate of diffusion can be explained by the regression.
Thus the model, simple and incomplete though it is, seems quite useful.49
Actually, the analysis is carried out with another measure of the rate of diffusion,
not Q2.Butusing the theoretical relationship between this measure and Q, Equation
18 follows.
These estimates were derived from correspondence with the firms. Each firm
was asked to estimate the average payout period for the diesel locomotives it bought
during 1946—57. The reciprocal of this payout period, which is a crude estimate of
the rate of return, was used as an estimate of p,.
48Strictlyspeaking, this percentage refers to the explained variation in the measure
referred to in note 46, not to Q1. See Mansfield, "Intrafirm Rates of Diffusion."
Estimates were made of the effects on the intrafirm rate of diffusion (using both
ownership and utilization data) of other variables besides p1, L1, S1, and Speci-
fically, I estimated the effect of:(1) the age distribution of the steam locomotives
owned by thefirm when it "began" to dieselize;(2) the absolute number of
diesel locomotives that thefirm had to acquire in order to go from 10 to 90 per
cent of full dieselization; (3) the average length of haul of the ith firm; and (4) the
profitability of thefirm. With use of ownership data, the effect of none of these
variables was significant. With use of utilization data, the age distribution of the
steam locomotives had a significant effect, but the other variables did not.TECHNICAL CHANGE IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 191
VIII.Recent and Prospective Changes in
Railroad Technology
In previous sections, I described measurements of the rate of technical
change and presented theoretical and empirical results regarding the
underlying processes of invention, innovation, and diffusion in the
railroad industry, but little attention was paid to the specific improve-
ments that have occurred recently in railroad technology. This section
tries to fill the gap.It presents a brief list of the more important
innovations that have come into limited or general use since World
War II, and the innovations on the horizon that presidents of twenty-
four Class I railroads regarded as potentially most important.5°
First, consider the improvements in locomotives. During the post-
war period almost all the nation's steam locomotives have been replaced
by the vastly more economical diesel locomotive.Moreover, the
diesel locomotive has been improved in a number of important ways.
Tractive effort and horsepower have been increased, cooling systems
have been improved, and electric circuits have been modified.In
addition, experiments have been carried out by the Southern Pacific
and the Denver and Rio Grande Western with diesel-hydraulic loco-
motives, which have proved useful in Europe.5'
Second, consider the improvements in rolling stock, which has
progressively increased in capacity and suitability for specific needs.
Important developments in this area have been the three-tier, rack-type
car for transporting autos, the mechanically refrigerated car, cars
equipped with various shock-absorbing and lading-protection devices,
cars using lubricating pads instead of oil-soaked waste packing, and
hot box detectors. In addition, there has been the enormously successful
use of piggybacking.
Third, consider the many applications of electronics to railroad
operations. Whereas there was practically no use of radio immediately
after World War II, it now is used between railroad offices, stations,
moving trains, crews of different trains, and crews on the locomotive
and caboose of the same train.In addition, over 8,000 miles of
Theselists were obtained by asking the presidents of thirty Class I railroads to
list (1) the changes in railroad technology occurring since World War II they con-
sidered most important, and (2) the innovations likely to be introduced in the next
decade and considered to be of considerable importance to the industry. Replies
were received from twenty-four, or 80 per cent of the railroad presidents.
On the diesel-hydraulic locomotive, see R. McBrian, "New Motive Power
Technology," Tec/tnolog!cal Change and the Future of the Railways, Evanston, 1961.192 TECHNICAL CHANGE IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY
microwave are now in service in the United States and Canada;52 and
electronic data processing equipment now is used in the area of account-
ing, payrolls, inventory and ordering work, car tracing and distribution,
and equipment maintenance. Moreover, computers have made possible
the application of various newly developed operations research tech-
niques.53Centralized traffic control, first employed in the twenties,
has been improved and its use has spread to over 31,000 miles of rail-
road. The automatic and semiautomatic classification yards, about
forty of which are in operation in the United States, materially im-
proved service and reduced operating costs.
Fourth, consider the improvements in track construction and main-
tenance. Probably the most important of these is the mechanization
of maintenance of way, which has enabled the railroads to do with
fifteen men what formerly required sixty.54In addition, there is the
welding of rail sections to form continuous lengths of 1,000 feet or more,
electronic and supersonic methods of testing rails, and improved
techniques for preserving crossties.
Finally, considering innovations in railroad technology that are on
the horizon (i.e., those likely to be introduced in the next decade),
which, if any, are likely to be of considerable importance to the industry
over the next few decades?In reply to this question, twenty-four
presidents of Class I railroads gave the following answers.First, most
of them listed the automated, crewless train, which is already being used
in a limited way on local operations. Second, many listed new types of
locomotives—the diesel hydraulic, locomotives powered by commercial
electricity and eventually, perhaps, by nuclear power. Third, many listed
the integral train; use of computers for simulation, train dispatching,
etc.; automated freight car identification; and further containerization.
IX. Technical Change, Investment,
and Prospective Employment
Supposing technical change in the railroad industry continues at its
1917—59 rate and that the industry's structure and work rules remain
52D. J. Russell, "United States Railroads: Developments, Problems and Oppor-
tunities," address before the International Railway Congress, June 22, 1962.
E.g., E. Mansfield and H. Wein, "A Model for the Location of Railroad
Classification Yard," Management Science, Apr. 1958;idem, "Linear Decision
Rules and Freight Yard Operations," Journalof Industrial En?ineerin?, Mar.—Apr.
1958;idem, "A Regression Control Chart for Costs," Applied Statistics, Mar. 1958;
M. Beckmann, C. McGuire and C. Winsten, Studies in the Economics of Transporta-
hot:, NewHaven,1956.
These figures comefrom correspondence with the president ofa major eastern road.TECHNICAL CHANGE IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 193
fixed, what will be the level of railroad employment by 1972? To help
answer this question, we assume that the model in equations 1 and 2
held in the railroad industry during the past and that it continues to hold
during 1960—72. Let us also assume that the estimates of 2.,ac, and ô
derived in Section III are correct and will continue to be correct
during 1960—72. If so, it follows that
r1959 1972 1.14
Q=e63.4E86 I e.232t1(t) + I I, (20)
U=184o £=1960 J
whereQisthe output of the railroad industry in 1972 (1929 =100),
Listhe total man-hours employed by the industry in 1972 (1929 =100),
and .7isthe annual gross investment (in millions of 1929
Thus,
( r 1959 1972
inL =.861 Q+63.4.14 In e232t1(t) + I }. (21)
Le=1840 1)
Using Equation 21 together with estimates ofand 7, one can obtain
conditional forecasts of L. Table 3 shows the values of L associated
with various levels ofand L
What are reasonable estimates ofand I? According to forecasts
made for this purpose by presidents of fourteen Class I railroads,is
likely to be about 144.56 (These forecasts were expressed in terms of
percentage increases over 1962, and the average forecast was a 19 per
cent inc.rease, the standard deviation being 9 percentage points.) With
regard to 7,useof 400 does not seem unreasonable; it is the average
value of 1(t) during the late fifties (1954—59). Of course, these are only
informed guesses, but what do they imply about To judge from
Table 3, they imply that railroad employment in 1972 will be 35.7 per
cent of its 1929 level, or 7 per cent less than its 1962 level.
How does this result compare with other sorts of forecast? According
to forecasts made by the railroad presidents, employment in 1972 will
be about 5 per cent below its 1962 level.(This is the average of their
forecasts, and the standard deviation about this average was 12 per-
centage points.) Thus, their average forecast is not too different from
I assume in Equation 19 that pre-1840 investment can be neglected and that
gross investment can be assumed to occur at a constant rate during 1960—72. More-
over, rough estimates of 1(t) must be used for 1840—70, since Ulmer's figures go back
only to 1870. Also, 5-year moving averages of 1(t) are used for 1870—19 10 rather than
the data for individual years used in previous sections of the paper. This should
make little difference.
56Theseforecasts, like those described in the following paragraph in the text,
wete obtained cOrrespondence with the ftrms. The 1962 values of Q and L
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TABLE3
CONDITIONAL FORECASTS OF 1972 RAILROADEMPLOYMENT, GIVEN1972






















































ours.However, if one uses the relatively crude, but common, procedure
of extrapolating output per man-hour and dividing it into the
resulting forecast is that railroad employment in 1972 will be about
40.4 per cent of the 1929 level, or 5percent above its 1962 level.57
This is appreciably higher than our forecast.
In conclusion, on the basis of these estimates ofand 7, the model
indicates that railroad employment will be 7 per cent below its 1962
level, if technical change continues at its 1917—59 rate. Any forecast of
this sort should be taken with a generous grain of salt.First, the
estimates of QandI may be wrong. These variables are influenced by
changes in factor prices, prices of competing means of transportation,
consumer tastes, income levels, conditions in the money market,
policies of regulatory agencies, and a host of other factors. To forecast
and us almost as difficult as to forecast IL itself.
Second, the production function in Equation 2 is obviously only a
first approximation. For example, since economies of scale are omitted,
the potential effects of the much-publicized, proposed mergers on
employment are excluded.These effects are likely to be important.
Third, it is assumed implicitly that the ratio of the amount of labor
Extrapolating the regression of the logarithm of railroad output per man-hour
on time, the resulting estimate of 1972 output per man-hour is 359 (1929 =100).
Dividingthis estimate into the forecast of weobtain 40.4asan estimate of L.TECHNICAL CHANGE IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY 195
employed to the minimum amount required to produce the forecasted
level of output will be close to the ratio of actual to required employ-
ment in the past. If this ratio were to decrease, because of changes in
union or public policy, the results would obviously be affected. How-
ever, the required correction might not be difficult to make.58
X. Summary and Conclusion
My purpose in this paper has been to estimate the rate of technical
change in the railroad industry and to investigate the underlying
processes of invention, innovation, and diffusion responsible for
important changes in railroad practices. The principal results are as
follows:
1. During 1890—1953, output per man-hour rose more rapidly in
the railroad industry than in the economy as a whole but less rapidly
than in all transportation. Comparing periods of relatively full employ-
ment, output per man—hour in the railroad industry rose at a relatively
steady rate during that period.
2. On the assumption that technical change was capital embodied
and neutral and that the production function was Cobb-Douglas, the
rate of technical change in the railroad industry, defined as a shift over
time in the production function, was about 3.0 per cent per year. This
compares with Solow's estimate of 2.5 per cent per year for the economy
as a whole.
3. To judge from Schmookler's chronology of railroad patents and
important railroad inventions, there was a tendency, during 1870—1 950,
58 Itis often asserted that there is a considerable amount of featherbedding in the
railroad industry.If essentially useless "make work" accounted for a relatively
stable proportion of the total time put in each year by labor, L(t), which is an index
number, will not be affected appreciably whether it is based on actual employment
or minimum necessary employment. So long as the labor time not devoted to
make "work" was allocated optimally among vintages of capital, the estimates in
Table 3—as well as the estimates ofin Section HI—are unaffected by the presence
of "make work." But if the latter were to be eliminated or cut substantially, the
estimates in Table 3 would obviously be too high. Given any set of assumptions
about changes in work rules, it should be possible to make at least an approximate
correction. For some relevant discussions, see The Report of the Presidential Railroad
Commission, Washington, 1962; and M. Horowitz, Manpower Utilization in the
Railroad Industry, Boston, 1960.
Note too that we do not distinguish among various kinds of labor in this section.
For a description of recent changes in the relative importance of various occupations,
see W. Haber and others, Maintenance of Way Employment on U.S. Railroads,
Detroit, 1957; and E. Jakubauskas', "Technological Change and Recent Trends in
the Composition of Railroad Employment," Quarterly Review of Economics and
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for the rate of occurrence of these inventions to decrease with time, such
a tendency being in accord with the Kuznets, Burns, and Fabricant
hypothesis. There was also a tendency, in accord with Schmookler's
hypothesis, for the rate of invention to be directly related to the lagged
rate of capital formation in the railroad industry.
4. On the basis of a small sample of the most important innovations
occurring in the twentieth century, the largest railroads seemed to do
a disproportionately large share of the innovating, disproportionate in
terms of their share of the industry's ton-miles.In part, this can be
explained by the capital requirements needed to innovate, the minimum
size of firm required to use the innovations, and the size distribution
of the potential users.
5.Whena new technique is introduced by one railroad, several
decades usually elapse before all the others begin using it. As in other
industries, the rate of imitation seems to be directly related to the
profitability of the innovation and inversely related to the size of the
investment required to introduce it. However, holding these factors con-
stant, the imitation process seems to go on at a somewhat slower pace in
the railroad industry than in the other industries for which we have data.
6. Judging by the diesel locomotive, the rate at which a railroad, once
it begins to use a new technique, substitutes it for older methods is
directly related to the profitability of the investment in the new tech-
nique, the length of time the firm waited before beginning to use it, and
the liquidity of the firm; but the rate of substitution is inversely related
to the size of the firm.
7. Some of the most important developments since World War II
have been replacement of steam locomotives by diesels, the extension
of piggybacking, use of larger and special-purpose cars, application of
electronic data processing, the spread of centralized traffic control,
development of automatic classification yards, and mechanization of
maintenance of way.
8. According to twenty-four railroad presidents, the innovations on
the horizon that are likely to be most important during the next few
decades are the automated, crewless train, the integral train, the diesel-
hydraulic locomotive, locomotives powered by commercial electricity,
automated freight car identification, further use of computers, and
further containerization.
9. If the production function continues to shift at the 1917—59 rate
and if the railroads continue to invest in new plant and equipment
at the 1955—59rate,one can estimate the industry's 1972 labor require-
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the calculation a 19 per cent increase in output, which was the average
forecast made by the railroad presidents, the results suggest that
railroad employment in 1972 will be about 7 per cent below its 1962
level. This is fairly close to the average forecast made by the railroad
presidents—that 1972 employment will be 5percent below its 1962
level.Note, however, that thisassumes that no important mergers or
changes in work rules take place.
Besides promoting a better understanding of the processes of in-
novation and technical change in the railroad industry, these findings
may be useful in connection with the formulation of public policy. They
provide information about the technical progressiveness, or backward-
ness, of the railroad industry relative to other industries. They provide
employment forecasts which, despite their roughness, should be useful
in indicating the extent of the future unemployment problem in the
industry. They compare some aspects of the technological performance
of large and small railroads, a relevant consideration in estimating the
effect of the proposed railroad mergers on technical progress in the
industry.
In conclusion, the limitations of these results should be emphasized.
The model used in Sections III and IX is obviously only a crude first
approximation. The data in Section IV have obvious weaknesses. The
results in Sections V to VII are based on only a few innovations, which
may not be entirely representative.Nonetheless, the findings should
be helpful, if used with caution, to transportation economists and
economists concerned with the processes of innovation and technical
change.